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It is suggested that “Hurricane Relief From the Sea” and
“Hurricane Relief From the Sea: Conference Proceedings”
be read prior to, or in conjunction with
“Hurricane Relief From the Sea: Options.”
Together, these publications can serve as a useful reference
when evaluating proposals for using RRF ships
in a relief from the sea role.
 
   
    
 
 
             
        
             
          
        
    
          
          
           
              





ABOUT THE STROM THURMOND INSTITUTE
OF GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
The Strom Thurmond Institute of Government and Public Affairs is a Public Service
Activity (PSA) of Clemson University. Established in 1981, the Institute conducts applied 
research and service in public policy areas at the local, regional, state and national levels. The
Institute draws upon the expertise of Clemson University faculty, staff and students and has an 
established record of collaborative partnerships with academic, governmental and private sector
scholars throughout the world.
The Institute also enhances awareness of current public policy issues on the Clemson 
campus and throughout the state and region through informal and formal educational programs.
The Institute sponsors research and public service programs to enhance civic awareness of public
policy issues and improve the quality of national, state and local government. The Institute is a
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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN TEXT
DoD U.S. Department of Defense
EMD Emergency Management Division. Each state has an EMD as does the
Federal Emergency Management Agency
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FOS Full Operating Status
HSD U.S. Department of Homeland Security
ICW Intercoastal Waterway. Inland waterway system along Atlantic and Gulf
coasts
LASH Lighter Aboard Ship. A merchant type ship where cargo is stored on barges
that can be landed in a non-port environment
Marad Maritime Administration. Agency within U.S. Department of Transportation
MASH Military Advanced Surgical Hospital
MSC Military Sealift Command. A part of DoD Transportation Command
NDRF National Defense Reserve Fleet
RO/RO* Merchant type vessel where cargo is on wheeled vehicles or on trailers that
can be offloaded by tractors
ROPU Reverse Osmosis Purification Unit
ROS Reduced Operating Status. Designation for a Ready Reserve Force vessel not
fully crewed and one where a specific number of days would be required for
the vessel to ready for sea.
RRF Ready Reserve Force. A part of the NDRF
SOCP Ship Operations Cooperative Program
USWRP U.S. Weather Research Program
*See Hurricane Relief From the Sea, pp. 13-14 for pictures of different classes of






          
               
      
      
 
              
       
       
 
           
         
           
    
 
             
               
               
       
 
       
             
        
          
         
     
      
 
          
         
        
         
       
 
       
  
           
     
 
             
           
          
          
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In November 2005, the Strom Thurmond Institute published the results of its research 
project “Hurricane Relief From the Sea.” This 25 page report was made available on the
Institute’s website (www.strom.clemson.edu). Hard copies were also distributed to
individuals and agencies presumed to have an interest in the concept.
The report was based on the premise that the relief from the sea concept, both in a
military and civilian context, is an historic fact, proven successful, with numerous
examples in the 20th and 21st centuries. [1]
Hurricane “Katrina,” which struck the U.S. Gulf coast on September 23, 2005, leaving in 
its wake approximately 1,400 dead, tens of thousands homeless, and multi-billions of
dollars in property damage, proved beyond question the value of a relief from the sea
capability when a disaster occurs.
In the context of the “Katrina” response effort, the report, “Hurricane Relief From the
Sea,” poses the question: If it is granted that the unplanned, ad hoc, relief from the sea
effort was one of the very few success stories in the aftermath of “Katrina,” is it not fair
to ask how much more could be accomplished with a pre-planned response?
On January 27, 2006, the Thurmond Institute sponsored a conference in Charleston,
South Carolina to further examine the concept of relief from the sea. Invitations were
limited to those individuals who would play a key role in the planning and
implementation of a response from the sea initiative. Included were state Emergency
Management personnel, port operations officials, representatives from the Maritime
Administration (Marad), Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA),
Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the U.S. Coast Guard.
Presentations were made by the Maritime Administration, the Department of Defense
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, the South Carolina Port Authority, the
South Carolina Emergency Management Division, the Seafarers International Union, a
former Chief, Division of Maintenance and Repair, Maritime Administration, and a
former Center for Disease Control medical researcher.
Conclusions Reached at the 27 January 2006 Conference
*The concept of “Hurricane Relief From the Sea” should be expanded to include all
disasters, on all coasts, including terrorist attacks.
Comment: While the relief from the sea concept is generally applicable to the U.S. Pacific
coast, including Alaska, there are important differences. The most likely natural disaster
with respect to Pacific coastal areas is an earthquake. Unlike hurricanes, earthquakes give
little, if any, warning with respect to time of occurrence and intensity, thus compromising 
  
             
             
      
             
           
       
 
                
             
 
 
         
     
  
       
        
    
 
 
    
     
    
       
  
 
     
 
        
        
 
          
          
 
 
              
  
 
           
       
 
           
              
         
 
          
         
a major advantage of a pre-loaded, pre-positioned relief ship, that is, its option of
remaining in port or putting to sea. Aside from a terrorist attack, the kinds of supplies and 
equipment and ship capabilities would differ significantly in preparing for a major
hurricane or major earthquake. Casualties from a major earthquake could be on the order
of five to tens greater than that of a major hurricane which would place medical
capabilities of an earthquake relief ship at a premium.
It is not suggested that the relief from the sea concept is not applicable to the Pacific
coast, only that it be developed in the context of the region’s most probable natural
disaster.
*Relief ships should be pre-loaded and pre-positioned at port(s) along the Atlantic and
Gulf coasts during hurricane season (June-November).
*The preferred ship(s) is a RO/RO. Within the
RO/RO class, a shallow draft vessel is preferred
with the capability to offload in a non-port
environment.
*Relief ships should be loaded with a standard 
package (supplies and equipment) but with some
flexibility to respond to specific requirements,
i.e. marginal changes in loading would be made
depending on the predicted hurricane intensity 
and landfall.
CAPE L CLASS RO-RO
*FEMA should release supplies and equipment from its inland depots, if requested to 
augment already loaded equipment and supplies on a pre-positioned relief ship.
*Should state supplies be on a relief ship and that ship responds to a hurricane landfall in 
another state, agreements between the states for release of such supplies should be in 
place?
*If funds not available for relief from the sea concept, Gulf and Atlantic coast states
could share costs.
*Since state EMD personnel will be the first responders communications between EMD
personnel and a relief ship is a priority requirement.
*With respect to utilizing MSC ships in the RRF in an emergency, it was pointed out that
such ships, by design, are not loaded. If a RRF ship or ships were made available on a
contingency basis, loading time would significantly increase response time (of the ship).
*Maritime Administration presenters made the case for using RRF “Cape L Class”
RO/ROs as relief ships. Two are now home-ported in Wilmington, NC.
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*It was agreed that with pre-planning, ROS time could be reduced from 4-5 days to 2-3
days.
*It was suggested that ship repair capability (shipyards) be included in relief from the sea
pre-planning.
*Various comments and suggestions were made with respect to medical capabilities on a
relief ship. The consensus was against having a dedicated medical relief ship. One
suggestion was having a Military Advanced Surgical Hospital (MASH) capability on 
board. After offloading, medical personnel would be flown to the MASH site.
*There was some disagreement with respect to port recovery time should landfall be
made at or near the port. e.g., Hurricane Hugo striking Charleston, SC in 1989. The need 
for a port to be operational or partially operational in 48 hours was deemed critical.
With respect to changes in channel depth after a hurricane, it was suggested that a small,
sonar equipped, vessel could lead a relief ship into port. [Ship Operations Cooperative
Program (SOCP) March 7-8, 2006, Jacksonville, FL; Meeting theme “Maritime Forum
for Domestic Disaster Relief.]
*It was suggested that one RRF ship be activated and loaded. The ship would visit






    
 
           
             
           





           
           
            
             




        
 
  
                                                                                                           
     
 
    
     
 
     
     
     
 
     
      
 
     
     
     
      
     
     
CHAPTER 2
ASSETS, CONCEPTS AND POLICY
The “Hurricane Relief From the Sea” report (November 2005) lists and comments on 
available assets and concepts that make relief from the sea a cost effective option when a
hurricane strikes the U.S. Atlantic and Gulf coasts. They are summarized here, together
with an emerging policy with respect to the use of Department of Defense assets in non-
military emergencies.
Assets
*The National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF), in particular 58 ships in the Ready 
Reserve Force (RRF) of which 31 are RO/ROs and of these, 20 are located on the
Atlantic and Gulf coasts in reduced operating status (ROS 5-10). [2] Table 1 lists these
vessels. Table 2 lists the relevant specifications for the different classes of RO/ROs in 
ROS status that could be considered as hurricane relief ship candidates.
TABLE 1
CANDIDATE RELIEF FROM THE SEA RO/RO RRF SHIPS
Atlantic Coast












































      
     
 
     
     
 
     
     
     
 
 
           
 
 
         
 
     
 
        
         
      
 
        
            
        
 
       
            
Gulf Coast
Cape Kennedy New Orleans, LA 5
Cape Knox " 5
Cape Victory Beaumont, TX 5
Cape Vincent " 5
Cape Taylor Houston, TX 5
Cape Texas " 5
Cape Trinity " 5
*ROS (Reduced Operating Status) Figures, e.g., 5, 10 are number of days to be
operational
Source: Department of Defense, U.S. Navy (Military Sealift Command)
CAPE F - LASH
Ships in the RRF are owned and maintained by the U.S. Maritime Administration and
funded from the U.S. Navy National Defense Sealift Fund. When activated, operational
control passes to the Military Sealift Command (MSC).
*Numerous deepwater seaports located along the U.S. Atlantic and Gulf coasts. No 
matter where a hurricane makes landfall, a deepwater port is within 24 hours steaming 
time (15 knot vessel) of that landfall. [3]
*Major highways and an Inter-Coastal Waterway (ICW) system connecting major ports
along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. e.g., US #17 from Wilmington, NC to Jacksonville,
5
  
             
 
 
        
 
 
               
         
              





       
    
 
               
           
 
           
 
                
 
               
 
                  
 
              
 
               
 
             
 
                
 
 
     
 
              
       
 




FL after which US #1 connects Florida east coast cities from Jacksonville to Key West.
[4]
*A pool of dedicated merchant seamen with many years experience in manning RRF
ships.
*A state of the art Hurricane Center located in Miami, FL. A goal of the U.S. Weather
Bureau Research Program (USWRP) is to reduce hurricane track uncertainty. It follows
that the greater the track certainty, the more effective is the concept of hurricane relief
from the sea.
TABLE 2
SPECIFICATIONS OF RRF RO/RO VESSELS IN ROS
(Atlantic and Gulf Coasts)
Ship. Year(s) Length Speed Draft Cargo 
Class/No Built Overall Max Max Capacity (sq ft.)
Cape D (5) 1972-73 680 ft. 17.1 kts 32 ft. 125,516
Cape E (1) 1971 653 " 17.1 " 32 " 121,400
Cape K (2) 1978-79 696 " 17.6 " 35 " 110,184
Cape L (2) 1972-73 682 " 17.1 " 20 " 56,600
Cape R (3) 1977 648 " 17.6 " 33 " 132,209
Cape V (2) 1984 632 " 15.0 " 28 " 99,942
Cape W (2) 1982 697 " 15.8 " 38 " 221,885
Cape T (3) 1977 634 " 16.7 " 28 " 88,136
Source: Maritime Administration: Ready Reserve Force.
FOS crew size varies from 27 (Cape D) to 30 (Cape L). Fuel consumption at full
operating speed varies from 550 bbls/day (Cape L) to 600 bbls/day (Cape D).





        
       
             
               
              
    
 
          
         
             





           
        
         
         
           
     
 
        
        
       
   
 
      
      
     








The modern day concept of pre-positioned, pre-loaded ships and ships maintained in a
reduced operating status dates from 1976 when funds were provided to repair/upgrade
and maintain a select group of ships in the NDRF to a point where they could be made
ready for sea in a matter of days rather than weeks or months. A number of World War II
Victory ships as well as some post war built ships formed the nucleus of what would later
become the RRF. [5]
Maintaining a ready reserve force of ships in reduced operating status (not loaded) and a
fleet of (loaded) pre-positioned ships located in the United States and overseas, has
proved its value in both Gulf Wars as well as in non-military emergencies. [6] The case
for a hurricane relief from the sea program is based on these well documented, proven
concepts.
Policy
The original rationale for maintaining a RRF was to provide a quick response sealift
capability in military contingencies. However, as noted in footnote #1, RRF ships have
been activated for non-military emergencies. In the cases of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
non-RRF, MSC controlled naval auxiliaries, also made significant relief contributions in 
the days, weeks, and months following landfall. Appendix III of “Hurricane Relief From
the Sea” summarizes these efforts.
The policy of using RRF ships for strictly military contingencies has progressively 
evolved into one that recognizes the contribution that DoD assets can make in an 
emergency. Recommendation #23 of “The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina:
Lessons Learned” states:
DoD should revise its Immediate Response
Authority (IRA) policy to allow commanders,
in appropriate circumstances, to exercise IRA










            
       
 
            
                
    
 
     
 
       
 
    
 
    
 
         
        
 
       
 
        
       
         
              
     
 
        
        
  
 
       
          
    
 
          
       
            
               
CHAPTER 3
RELIEF FROM THE SEA OPTIONS
Option #1
Activate one (1) “Class L” RO/RO now in ROS-10 located at Wilmington, NC from June
1 to November 30, 2006 (180 days). Return to ROS-10 after hurricane season ends.
Assumption is that the Department of the Navy will downgrade two “Class L” RO/ROs
from RRF to NDRF status and that the ships will be available for relief from the sea
assignments during the 2006 hurricane season.
ROS-10 to FOS $300,000 to $500,000
FOS 180 days ($30,000* x 180) 5,400,000
Return to ROS-10 300,000 to 500,000
Total $6,400,000**
*Includes crew wages, stores, regulatories, e.g. insurance, fuel, lubes, communication 
capabilities, misc. voyage repairs, other miscellaneous repairs. [8]
**Does not include cost of relief supplies/equipment.
Comment: Ships ready to load relief supplies 10 days after activation order. Load
capabilities: Various types of wheeled vehicles including tractor-trailers, containers on 
trailers, water trucks, fire and police equipment and portable generators. Limited amounts
of diesel fuel from ship’s bunkers available for land transfer as well as limited amounts of
fresh water and power from vessel’s generators.
Sponsoring agency, here assumed to be DHS, will decide whether relief
supplies/equipment will be offloaded, partially offloaded, or remain on ship after
hurricane season.
After hurricane season, sponsoring agency will maintain vessel in ROS-10 for 180 non-
hurricane days. Estimated cost is $1.8 million. This cost should be added to options 2-6 
as appropriate. [9]
Comment: At the 27 January conference in Charleston it was suggested that a
demonstration relief ship be activated and loaded. The ship would make port calls along 
the Atlantic and Gulf coasts to demonstrate a relief from the sea capability. Argued here
is that, for a number of reasons, a single ship would not meet a cost-benefit test in
8
  
          





           
 
                     
                                              
                                             
          
                                                             
                                                     
 
   
 




         
       
          
         
       
        
      
        






          
           
        
 
 
            





providing relief from the sea. If a “demonstration project” is decided upon, there should 
be two ships, one on the Atlantic and one on the Gulf coast.
Option #2
Same as option #1 but with additional relief features. Features and costs: [10]
Reverse Osmosis Purification Unit (1)
Industrial Ice Maker (1)
Diesel generator (l set)










Activation, deactivation, operating costs 6,400,000
TOTAL $10,400,000
Comment: Above features can be added individually as preferred which will vary total
cost of package. Assuming complete package as described above and permanently 
installed, ship can be ready to load in 120 days from activation order. If time is an 
important consideration, certain features can be added in less time and at less cost.
Example: Additional water making capability can be obtained by buying skid mounted
ROPUs and hooking up to ship’s power supply (2 weeks). Accommodations for 7-10 
additional personnel can be accomplished during 10-day activation period. Other
temporary capabilities are possible as demonstrated by MSC and RRF ships that
responded to hurricanes Katrina and Rita. See Appendix III, “Hurricane Relief From the
Sea.”
Option #3
Activate two (2) “Class L” RO/ROs. Preload and preposition one ship on the Atlantic
coast and one ship on the Gulf coast. Cost without additional relief features as stated in 
Option #2 is $12.8 million. Cost with additional features (complete package) is $20.8 
million.
Advantage of two ships of the same class is (1) sharing learning experience, (2)





          
           
        
         
            
           
     
 
 
                                         
 
                                           
 
                      
 
                                                                              
 
 
           
           
         
 
          
         
  
 
             






            
           
          
          
        
 
         
           
          
     
 
Option #4
The hurricane relief from the sea sponsoring agency, here assumed to be DHS, would 
conclude an agreement with DoD to transfer two (2) RRF RO/ROs in ROS-5 or 10 status
to DHS during hurricane season (1 June to 30 November). DHS would assume fiscal
responsibility for the two ships for that six-month period. Ships would be preloaded and 
pre-positioned, one on the Atlantic coast, one on the Gulf coast. No additional relief
features as described in option #1 would be added to the vessels. At the end of hurricane
season, ships would be offloaded and returned to MSC control.
ROS 5 or 10 to FOS $600,000 - to $1,000,000
FOS 180 days ($30,000 x 180) 10,800,000
Return to ROS 5 or 10 (MSC control) 600,000 - to 1,000,000
Total $12,800,000
Comment: This option is available only if DoD is willing to release ships between 1 June
and 30 November. Risk is that DoD might insist on agreement clause for ships to be
returned in a national emergency. Choice of RO/ROs would be decided by DoD.
Advantage to DHS is that DoD would maintain vessels in ROS 5-10 during six-month
non-hurricane season. Advantage to DoD is reduction in yearly cost to maintain two ships
in ROS status.
Disadvantage to DHS is that DoD requires its ROS/RRF ships to be empty. Prior to
return to DoD, equipment/supplies would have to be offloaded and returned to inland
depots. [11]
Option #5
Pairing two (2) state maritime academy training ships such as the TS State of Maine [12]
with options #3 or #4. Appendix A lists these vessels, their status and capabilities.
Vessels would be maintained in an “as is” status or additional relief ship features
particular to a training ship could be added, but not necessarily those described in option 
#1. This option assumes no added relief features as described in option #1.
Cost to bring a training ship to ready for sea status is essentially the
activation/deactivation cost of a “Class L” RO/RO that was estimated at $600,000 –
$1,000,000. Given the periodic active status of these vessels. e.g., training cruises,
$700,000 is the most likely estimate.
10 
 
         
              
 
           
            
        
          
          
         
       





          
           
           
            
  
 
        
          
      
     
 
 
      
 
            
               
            
     
 
               
        
        
             
      
 
            
               
          
             
           
           
One training ship would be paired with one RO/RO as described in options #3 and #4.
One pair would be home ported on the Atlantic coast, one pair on the Gulf coast.
Comment: Pairing a RO/RO with a training ship would produce a complementary relief
from the sea package. The training ship, with its in place capability to house and feed 
large numbers of first responders, and the RO/RO, pre-loaded with supplies and 
equipment destined for shore side recovery efforts, would negate the necessity of a single
vessel performing all the tasks required in a relief effort. The RO/ROs primary 
responsibility would be to deliver relief supplies/equipment to the impacted area in the
shortest time possible. Command and control centers, media centers, and enhanced 
medical capabilities would be tasked to the training ship.
Option #6
Adding the capabilities of two (2) cruise ships to option #5. One ship would be pre-
assigned to the Atlantic coast, one to the Gulf coast. Contracts would be negotiated prior
to the beginning of hurricane season and would terminate at the end of hurricane season.
The decision of whether or not to activate a cruise ship would be that of the sponsoring 
agency, presumably DHS.
Comment: Cruise ships provided housing and meals to evacuees and relief personnel in
Katrina’s aftermath, which demonstrated their potential value in the case of a category 4-
5 hurricanes. But also demonstrated was the need for a pre-planned response should 
cruise ships again be needed. [13]
Suggested Options Not Considered in Detail
It was generally agreed at the 27 January 2006 Hurricane Relief From the Sea Conference
in Charleston, SC that a RO/RO type vessel was the logical choice as a candidate ship(s)
in a relief from the sea scenario. This chapter is premised on that conclusion. Two other
options have, however, been suggested and are noted here.
One is the inclusion of tug-barge ships in a relief from the sea program. This option was
suggested and discussed at the March 7-8, 2006, meeting in Jacksonville, FL of the Ship 
Operations Cooperative Program. Barges would be pre-loaded and pre-positioned at ports
on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. They would either remain in port or put to sea depending 
on the predicted hurricane landfall land and its intensity.
Another option that was noted in the Hurricane Relief From the Sea report was to expand 
the relief from the sea concept to include the Bahamas and other countries in or bordering
on the Gulf of Mexico or the Caribbean Sea. The preferred ship in this scenario would be
a “Cape F” LASH vessel with its ability to float barges ashore in a non-port environment.
An important qualification, however, is that there must be sufficient offshore water depth 
in the hurricane impacted area given that the four RRF LASH ships draw between 35-38 
11 
 
          
              
     
 
feet. Presumably this option would be internationally funded. A drawback is that because
there are only four LASH ships in the RRF, DoD would probably be reluctant to have a







           
            
         
    
 
          
             
               
             
         
             
               
         
 
               
           
         
 
   
        
      
     
  
        
 
     
 
      
 
       
 
      
 
             
 
 
            
            





In evaluating options with respect to hurricane relief from the sea, the economic concept
of cost-benefit analysis can be helpful. While the concept may seem straightforward, it is
not that simple. While costs can usually be estimated with some precision, benefits, in 
many cases, must be measured subjectively.
In the case of option #3, preposition two Class L RO/ROs with additional relief features
on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts at an estimated cost of $20.8 million. This takes care of
the cost side of the equation. The next step is to define “benefit” in such a way that lends
itself, at least partially, to a quantitative interpretation. Here benefit will be defined as
“Relief supplies/equipment delivered where needed in the shortest time possible after a
hurricane makes landfall.” While still subjective, a part of benefit can now be quantified.
That is, the time it takes to reach the disaster area and distribute relief supplies. Thus, 4
days is better than 5, 3 better than 4 and so on.
The next step is to evaluate the relief from the sea option compared to the relief from the
land option in terms of costs and benefits as defined. While the below comparison is
subjective it is based on logic as well as historic data.
Estimated
Hurricane Time to Reach Disaster Benefit Compared to
Category Area and Distribute Cost
Relief Supplies
By Land By Sea* 
1 <12 hours <12 hours Land advantage
2 12-24 hours 12-24 hours Land advantage
3 24-48 hours 24-48 hours Equal advantage
4-5 72-120 hours 24-48 hours Sea advantage
*Relief ship remains in port or returned to port in 48 hours or less. Land option is by road
and air.
Based on the above, the conclusion is that the relief from the sea option generates a
greater benefit in the case of a category 4-5 hurricane; is essentially equal to the land




          
             
               
        
 
         
              
               
             
  
 
           
             
   
 
              
              
            
               
          
    
           
         
             
             
          
              
           
 
             
        
                 
         
           
              
             
       
           
   
 
          
            
         
           
        
             
The task now is to assign probabilities to different category hurricanes occurring in a
given hurricane season. If the probability of a category 4-5 hurricane is high, the more
cost effective a hurricane relief from the sea option. If the probability is low, then the
from the land option is the more cost effective.
During the 2005 hurricane season three hurricanes, category 1 or greater, made landfall
on the U.S. Atlantic and Gulf coasts. Of the three, one had maximum winds of 130 mph,
the upper limit of a category 3. The remaining two had winds of 150 mph. If non-U.S.
landfalls are included, two more hurricanes would be added; one at 100 mph, one at 150 
mph. [14]
In the period 1974-2004, 94 hurricanes, category 1 or greater made landfall on the
Atlantic and Gulf coasts. Of these three were category 4-5, 13 were category 3, and the
remaining categories 1-2. [15]
If the year 2005 is used to calculate category probabilities, a strong case can be made in
terms of cost-benefit analysis for option #6, that is, a RO/RO plus a school ship on each 
coast in addition to a contingency contract for a cruise ship on each coast. If the 30 year
period 1974-2004 is used, the benefit of the relief from the sea option decreases, that is,
only 18 percent of the reported hurricanes would justify funding an option #5 or #6.
Another economic concept that is useful in evaluating sea and land relief options is
“opportunity cost.” Opportunity cost is the cost of an option in terms of an opportunity 
foregone. In the case of relief from the sea, if DHS allocates $20.8 million to buy and
maintain “X” number of trailers to house hurricane evacuees, the opportunity cost of the
$20.8 million is funding, for example, option #3 as described above. [16] In evaluating 
the benefit of a relief from the sea package, the importance of understanding the
opportunity cost concept cannot be overstated. Appendix B explains the concept in detail.
At the January 27, 2006, Hurricane Relief From the Sea Conference and the March 7-8,
2006, meeting of the Ship Operations Cooperative Program, an oft-repeated question was
“Where will the funds come from for a relief from the sea option?” The simple answer is
that the money is already there. The requested FY 2006 DHS budget contains $30.6 
billion in discretionary funds of which FEMA is allocated $2.63 billion. Thus, the issue is
not funds per se but how to allocate existing funds. Argued here that in terms of
opportunity costs, a strong case can be made for funding option #3. As of the date of this
report, option #3 can be implemented in time for the 2006 hurricane season and option #5 
could be in place by 1 September. Examples of support for hurricane relief package can 
be found in Appendix C.
In assessing the likelihood of implementing any of the above relief from the sea options,
the odds are not favorable. Unfortunately, the maritime world, its assets and capabilities
are not well understood or appreciated with respect to hurricane relief programs. This can 
be no better demonstrated than by a careful reading of the February 2006, “The Federal
Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned” (217 pages). In this respect, Appendix 
B, “What Went Right,” cited, among many, the contributions of the Bureau of Prisons,
14 
 
          
         
           
        
         
        
         
           
      
 
           
            







    
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and the Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service. No mention was made, however, of the unplanned,
ad hoc but very successful, relief contributions made by NDRF and MSC ships. Nor did
Appendix A-Recommendations do much to illuminate the contribution of ships in the
aftermath of Katrina. One hundred twenty-five recommendations were made. Absent
bureaucratic language, recommendation #24 stated “DoD should coordinate with DHS
and DOT to identify DoD’s contingency role in airport operations and evacuations, and 
the planning and use of Ready Reserve Fleet vessels for housing, evacuation,
communications, command, control and logistics.” [17]
The chance of those charged with hurricane relief responsibilities –federal, state and local
government officials - of noting and appreciating the above 18 words with respect to the






        
       
           
         
             
      
 
         
    
         
 
 
          
         
           
   
 
               
    
 
    
 
           
              
          
 
 
            
       
          
 
 
          
  
 
          
       
 
            
             
         
           
 
NOTES
1. Ready Reserve Force ships were activated in the Somalia peacekeeping operation 
(1992) in Haiti Operation Democracy (1994), in Operation Desert Storm/Desert
Shield (1990), and Iraqi Freedom (2003). Nine RRF vessels and one NDRF vessel
were activated to support relief efforts following hurricanes Katrina and Rita (2005).
Of these, two were training ships, TS State of Maine and TS Empire State. See also 
Appendix III, Hurricane Relief From the Sea.
Ten Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force ships, six Maritime Pre-Positioned ships, and the
hospital ship USNS Mercy rendered assistance in Operation Unified Assistance
(Tsunami, Southeast Asia, 2005). In all, 20 MSC ships participated in Operation
Unified Assistance.
2. U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration. National Defense
Reserve Fleet Inventory for Month Ending February 28, 2006, pp. 4,7,8 and
Department of Defense, Department of the Navy FSS/LMSR and RRF Surge Sealift
Layberth Locations, p. 1.
3. Hurricane Relief From the Sea, Figure 1. “U.S. Hurricane Landfalls and Major Port
Cities,” pp. 5-7 and pp. 6-7.
4. Ibid. pp. 7-8.
5. The first no warning test of activating a Ready Reserve Force ship was completed on
16 May 1978, after MSC gave the order to make the SS Pride, a post war built C-3,
ready to load in a specified time frame. The test was successful with several hours to 
spare.
6. Delays in breaking out RRF ships in the first Gulf War (Desert Storm/Desert Shield)
lead to better record keeping and maintenance. The additional expense proved its
value when ships were activated with few problems in the 2nd Gulf War, Iraqi
Freedom.
7. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina; Lessons Learned (February 2006) p.
94.
8. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration. The Cape “L” Class
Vessels: Features Useful for Pre-positioned Disaster Relief Mission (2005).
9. The requested FY 1999 budget for maintaining 98 RRF ships in a 4-20 day readiness
status was $260 million. On average, the cost per ship, per year was between $2-3
million. The requested FY 2006 budget to maintain 58 RRF ships is $204.47 million




           
 
 
            
 
 
           
   
 
          
            
        
        
  
             
         
          
         
       
 
          
   
 
         
          
   
 
             
           
  
 
          
   
         
10. The Cape “L” Class Vessels: Features Useful for Pre-positioned Disaster Relief
Mission (2005).
11. Desert Storm average ship loading/unloading time for all classes of RO/ROs was 1-
2 days.
12. The Strom Thurmond Institute. Hurricane Relief From the Sea: Conference
Proceedings, 27 January 2006 (Appendix).
13. During the hurricane Katrina relief effort, FEMA signed a six month, contract with 
Carnival Cruise Lines for the use of three cruise ships. The bid was $192 million 
plus $44 million for reimbursable expenses. This contract and its execution ignited 
several contentious debates with respect to the Katrina relief effort.
Tom Coburn (R-OK) argued that if the ships were at capacity (7,116 evacuees for
six months) the price per evacuee would be $1,275/week whereas a seven day 
Caribbean cruise out of Galveston cost $599. On the other hand, government
contract officials defended the deal arguing, “we’re getting a pretty good value.”
Source: Jonathan Weisman, Washington Post, September 28, 2005.
14. NOAA Satellite and Information Service. Climate of 2005 Atlantic Hurricane
Season, pp. 3-5.
15. National Weather Service, National Hurricane Center (Tropical Prediction Center).
The Deadliest, Costliest, and Most Intense United States Tropical Cyclones From
1851 to 2004, pp. 10-19.
16. FEMA spent a total of $441 million for 10,777 trailers to house evacuees of
hurricane Katrina. As of February 12, 2006, over 10,000 were located at an airport
in Hope, Arkansas.























         
   
 
         
            
     
 
      
    
    
      
 
            
           
 
             
          
     
 
             
    
 
               
          
             
 
    
      
 
                
             
        
 
    
      
 
         
          
    
APPENDIX A
ROLE OF MARITIME ACADEMY SCHOOL SHIPS IN HURRICANE RELIEF
FROM THE SEA
Seven passenger ships, held in “Retention” status, are part of the Maritime
Administration’s National Defense Reserve Fleet. Four of these are on loan to state
maritime academies for training purposes.
TS Empire State New York
TS Enterprise Massachusetts
TS Golden Bear California
TS State of Maine Maine
A fifth ship, undergoing repairs/remodeling, will be loaned to the State of Texas as a
school ship. All of the school ships were built between 1962-89.
School ships are titled to the U.S. government. Their operations are funded by the
various states and the federal government. They can be activated for emergency service
by the Secretary, Department of Transportation.
Two school ships, the TS State of Maine and the TS Empire State participated in the
Hurricane Katrina relief effort.
TS State of Maine. Total time to activate 4 days, 20 hours. Arrived New Orleans area
18 September 2005, departed 16 November 2005. Number of days supporting relief
effort 59. Services provided to first responders, evacuees, state and federal agencies:
Meals served 32,886
Days sheltered Average people 144/day
TS Empire State. Total time to activate 7 days, 1 hour. Arrived New Orleans area 16
September 2005, departed 3 March 2006. Number of days supporting relief effort 163.
Services provided to first responders, evacuees, state and federal agencies:
Meals served 145,000
Days sheltered Average people 400/day
Sources: Maritime Administration, National Defense Reserve Fleet Inventory For Month 
Ending 28 February 2006, and Post Hurricane “KATRINA” and “RITA” Relief Notes.



























           
         
      
 
       
             
          
      
              
           
          
         
 
               
              
               
             
                
          
 
           
         
    
       
      
APPENDIX B
OPPORTUNITY COST
“Opportunity cost is a term used in economics to mean the cost of something in terms of
an opportunity foregone (and the benefits that could be received from that opportunity),
or the most valuable forgone alternative.
Opportunity cost need not be assessed in monetary terms, but rather can be assessed in 
terms of anything that is of value to the person or persons doing the assessing. The
consideration of opportunity costs is one of the key differences between the concepts of
economic cost and accounting cost. Assessing opportunity costs is fundamental to 
assessing the true cost of any course of action. In the case where there is no explicit
accounting or monetary cost (price) attached to a course of action, ignoring opportunity
costs may produce the illusion that its benefits cost nothing at all. The unseen opportunity 
costs then become the hidden costs of that course of action,
Note that opportunity cost is not the sum of the available alternatives, but rather of benefit
of the best alternative of them. The opportunity cost of a city’s decision to build a
hospital on its vacant land is the loss of the land for a sporting center, or the inability to
use the land for a parking lot, or the money that could have been made from selling land,
or the loss of any of the various other possible uses—but not all of these in aggregate,
because the land cannot be used for more than one of these purposes.
It is important, as individuals and as societies, to compare the opportunity costs
associated with various courses of action. However, some opportunities may be difficult
to compare along all relevant dimensions.”





         
 
 
       
          
 
 
       
         
          
         
        
 
            
        
          
       
     
       
       
              
        
 
        
 
             
 
        
            
       
         
        
       
 
          
           
 
           
 
      
          
      
 
APPENDIX C
TESTIMONIALS AND SUPPORT FOR RELIEF FROM THE SEA CONCEPT
Numerous testimonials have acknowledged and honored the ships and crews that
participated in Hurricanes Katrina and Rita relief efforts. Several of the many dozens are
cited here.
*Hurricane Relief…….Another lesson learned is the dependability of the U.S. Ready 
Reserve Force and the civilian crews who serve aboard those vessels. Several ships
braved the storms at dock and provided immediate aide in the form of sanctuary, potable
water, food, fuel and health services to emergency personnel. Other ships returned from
the Gulf after riding out the storms to supply additional assistance.
In the wake of this heroic effort the MTD (Maritime Trades Department, AFL-CIO)
strongly urges officials with the Department of Transportation and the Department of
Homeland Security to initiate a pilot program to be called the Disaster Relief Fleet.
According to the plan, U.S.-flag vessels would be stocked with essential survival and 
emergency response materials, then prepositioned along America’s coasts in reserve
operating status. They would be sponsored by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency and fully crewed on short notice to provide immediate response to any disaster
site accessible from the sea. MTD affiliates will work with and support the efforts of the
government to assist in the creation of the Disaster Relief Fleet.
2006 MTD Executive Board Meeting, San Diego, CA February 24-25, 2006.
* * * * * *
*The men and women who crewed and operated these ships provided relief and care to 
the Gulf Coast at a critical time, and they have brought great honor and distinction to the
U.S. Merchant Marine. They moved quickly into the stricken area and provided food and 
shelter, plus improvising communications strategies, first aid—anything that was needed.
They demonstrated the extraordinary ingenuity of the merchant mariners and the
capability of the maritime industry to respond to a crisis.
John Jamian
Acting Maritime Administrator
* * * * * *
*Ceremony on January 30, 2006, recognizing individuals and organizations for their
relief efforts following Hurricane Katrina. The event was sponsored by the U.S. Maritime
Administration and the Port of New Orleans.
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Individual seamen received certificates of appreciation. The Maritime Administration 
also announced approval to award the Merchant Marine Medal For Outstanding
Achievement to the companies and crews that supported relief efforts following
hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
* * * * * *
*WHEREAS, the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) was established under Section 
11 of the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 to serve as a reserve of ships for national
defense and national emergency purposes, and the NDRF vessels are now located in the
James River, Virginia, in the Port of Beaumont, Texas, in Suisun Bay, California, and at
designated outported berths; and
WHEREAS, a ready reserve fleet component was established in 1976 as a part of the
NDRF to provide rapid deployment of military equipment later known as the Ready 
Reserve Force (RRF), and the NDRF vessels have supported shipping requirements in
seven wars and crisis from the days of the Korean War through operations ENDURING
FREEDOM AND IRAQI FREEDOM contributing significantly to the delivery of
equipment as it applies into the theater of combat operations; and
WHEREAS, the RRF is designed to support military and national emergency operations;
nonetheless, the RRF has stood ready to provide humanitarian assistance to Gulf Coast
Areas following Hurricane Katrina, and was called upon to provide extraordinary
assistance prior to and following the landfall of Hurricane Rita on September 24, 2005.
On September 22, immediately following the ordering of a mandatory evacuation in
Southeast Texas, representatives of the U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime
Administration and Captains of the RRF ships in Beaumont, Texas were requested to 
help the City of Beaumont and sister cities in Southeast Texas, together with Jefferson 
County, Texas, in providing a safe haven for City and county equipment and material that
would be necessary to support the post-hurricane landfall relief and recovery efforts; and
WHEREAS, following the landfall of Hurricane Rita, the RRF ships, Cape Victory and
Cape Vincent, became home to the City of Beaumont personnel as well continuing to 
provide a safe haven for its equipment; and
WHEREAS, without the unwavering support of the Maritime Administration and the
heroic actions of the Captains and crews of its RRF ships, the Cape Victory and Cape
Vincent, the hurricane recovery efforts in Southeast Texas would have been significantly 
prolonged;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Guy N. Goodson, Mayor of the City of Beaumont, do hereby 
proclaim Tuesday, January 31, 2006 as “MARITIME ADMINISTRATION READY
RESERVE FLEET DAY” in Beaumont, and provide special thanks to John Jamain,
Deputy Maritime Administrator of the Maritime Administration, for the humanitarian
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assistance provided to the City of Beaumont, Texas, by the Maritime Administration and 
its RRF ships, the Cape Victory and Cape Vincent, and their extraordinary Captains and 
crews.
ACCORDINGLY, the Mayor has
hereunto set his hand and caused
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* In addition to suggestions made in his “after action” report, Captain Wade suggested 
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